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NO CLOSER TO CLARITY: THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE SUPREME
STUMBLE IN VAN ORDEN V. PERRY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment commands:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
. 1 For more than 200 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled
to apply that seemingly simple mandate,2 and its recent ruling in Van
Orden v. Perry3 only makes matters worse.
In Van Orden, decided in June 2005, the Court ignored much of its
precedent to uphold a display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas
State Capitol grounds.' In doing so, the Court confused an already
complex area of law by failing to adopt a consistent test or overrule old
ones. Thomas Jefferson described a "wall of separation between church
and State",5 that preserves the government's neutrality in matters of
religion.6 The practical application of Jefferson's metaphor over the
years has shown that his wall has some holes, where the intermingling of
state power with religion is constitutional.7 Because the Court has not
settled on a method to determine where those holes are,8

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

2. See Adam M. Conrad, Note, Hanging the Ten Commandments on the Wall Separating
Church and State: Toward a New Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,38 GA. L. REV. 1329,
1334-35 (2004) (discussing competing Establishment Clause tests).
3. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
4. See id. at 2861 (plurality opinion). A plurality of the Justices acknowledged the
validity of its most-frequently applied Establishment Clause analysis, but did not use it, giving
only the simple explanation that the test was "not useful." Id.
5. Id. at 2874 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
6. See Julie Van Groningen, Thou Shalt Reasonably Focus on its Context: Analyzing
Public Displays of the Ten Commandments, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 222-23 (2004); see also
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2742 (2005) (stating that government neutrality
is an objective of the Establishment Clause); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that government endorsement of religion
would violate the principle of neutrality that is necessary in a pluralistic society).
7. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing inclusion of a creche in a cityowned holiday display); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (allowing prayer by a statepaid chaplain in state legislature).
8. See Conrad, supra note 2, at 1340.
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constitutionality under the Establishment Clause is "largely an exercise
in subjective interpretation by judges." 9 Van Orden will keep it that
way.
This Note examines the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
culminating in an analysis of the decision in Van Orden. Part II contains
a summary of Van Orden, and Part III outlines several of the Court's
Establishment Clause decisions since 1980. The examination of Van
Orden follows in Part IV, which concludes that the Court's holding was

not only improper, both in its method and in light of the precedent
outlined in this Note, but also brought the Court no closer to clarifying
this complicated area of law.
II. FACTS OF VAN ORDEN V. PERRY

In 1961, a granite monolith inscribed with the text of the Ten
Commandments" was placed on the grounds of the Texas State
Capitol." Donated by a private civic organization, 2 the monolith is now
one of seventeen monuments on the twenty-two-acre grounds that
commemorate pieces of Texas history and identity."

Besides bearing

9. Brian T. Coolidge, Comment, From Mount Sinai to the Courtroom: Why Courtroom
Displays of the Ten Commandments and Other Religious Texts Violate the Establishment
Clause, 39 S.TEX. L. REV. 101, 106 (1997).
10. In the Jewish and Christian faiths, the Ten Commandments "represent the literal
word of God" given to Moses on Mount Sinai and passed down to his followers. Van Orden,
125 S.Ct. at 2879 (Stevens, J., dissenting). There are several versions of the Commandments
adhered to by different religions and denominations. Id. at 2880. The version inscribed on
the monolith on the Texas Capitol grounds reads as follows:
I AM the LORD thy God. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images. Thou shalt not take
the Name of the Lord thy God in vain. Remember the Sabbath day, to
keep it holy. Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long
upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee. Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not
bear false witness against thy neighbor. Thou shalt not covet thy
neighbor's house. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his
manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy
neighbor's.
Id. at 2873-74.
11. Id. at 2858 (plurality opinion).
12. Id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 2858 n.1 (plurality opinion). The following monuments appear on the Texas
Capitol grounds: Heroes of the Alamo, Hood's Brigade, Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer
Fireman, Terry's Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy, Spanish-American War, Texas National
Guard, Ten Commandments, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer Woman, The
Boy Scouts' Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans, Korean War Veterans,
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the words of the Decalogue, the monument is adorned with carved
patriotic and religious 4 symbols and an inscription marking its
presentation to the state.
Forty years after the monolith's erection, its placement was
challenged as a violation of the Establishment Clause, with the plaintiff
seeking an injunction for its removal." On June 27, 2005, a plurality of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices held that the monument's location on the
capitol grounds is constitutional. 6

In an analysis "driven both by the nature of the monument and by
our Nation's history," the Court called its most frequently applied
Establishment Clause test "not useful,"' 7 and described a government
tradition of religious acknowledgments that includes several depictions
of religious figures or symbols in federal buildings." Reasoning that the
Ten Commandments have both religious and historical significance,"

the Court held that the monolith was a "passive use of those texts" that
fits properly among the monuments representing aspects of Texas
history.o2
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE VAN ORDEN:
A"GEOMETRY OF CROOKED LINES"'"

The test the Van Orden plurality so easily dismissed was the Court's
first official Establishment Clause test, adopted in 1971 in Lemon v.

Soldiers of World War I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas Peace Officers. Id.
14. Id. at 2858. "An eagle grasping the American flag, an eye inside of a pyramid, and
two small tablets with what appears to be an ancient script are carved above the text of the
Ten Commandments." Id. Two Stars of David and Greek letters representing Jesus Christ
are carved below the text, along with an inscription marking the monument's presentation to
the state by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1961. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 2859.
17. Id. at 2861.
18. See id. at 2862-63. The Court cited numerous depictions of religious figures or
symbols used in government buildings, beginning with the Supreme Court Courtroom:
"Since 1935, Moses has stood.., among other lawgivers in the south frieze. Representations
of the Ten Commandments adorn the metal gates lining the north and south sides of the
Courtroom as well as the doors leading into the Courtroom." Id. at 2862. The plurality also
noted statutes of Moses and the Apostle Paul in the Library of Congress, depictions of the
Ten Commandments in the National Archives and the Department of Justice, and a
representation of Moses in the Chamber of the House of Representatives. Id. at 2862-63.
19. Id. at 2863.
20. Id. at 2864.
21. Conrad, supra note 2, at 1340 (quoting Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[90:155

Kurtzman.22

Under the so-called "Lemon test," government action
must have "a secular legislative purpose," must not have a primary
effect of either promoting or inhibiting religion, 2 and must avoid an
"excessive government entanglement with religion. 1
Although the Court has frequently applied this three-part test in
Establishment Clause cases, it has noted its "unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area., 24 As a
result, Establishment Clause jurisprudence is full of blurred lines and
plurality opinions, as the Court has "almost haphazardly, 25 applied,
21
ignored, or modified the Lemon analysis, or proposed entirely new
tests. 7 Nevertheless, in its Establishment Clause decisions since 1980,
the Court has consistently considered the context of the disputed
action,28 the action's nature or content,29 and what message a reasonable
observer would perceive from the action," even when the test it applies
in a given case is not clearly defined.
A. Stone v. Graham
The Court used the Lemon test to strike down a Kentucky statute
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schoolrooms
in Stone v. Graham.3' Although the statute also required an explanation
32
of the Decalogue's secular significance to be included in each display,
the Court held that simply hanging religious materials on the wall serves

22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

23. Id. at 612-13.
24. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).

25. Conrad, supra note 2, at 1340.
26. Compare County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (accepting

endorsement analysis as a refinement of the Lemon test), with Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 787-92 (1983) (examining history to determine whether the writers of the Establishment
Clause intended it to forbid legislative prayer), and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41
(1980) (applying three-pronged Lemon test).
27. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) (using coercion by the

government as indicator of unconstitutionality).
28. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-85 (focusing on creche display in the context of the

holiday season).
29. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2740 (2005) (considering

sectarian language of Ten Commandments display).
30. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308 (holding that a reasonable
student would believe that prayers offered under district policy at high school football games

were endorsed by the school).
31. 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
32. Id. at 41.
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no educational function.33 After noting that the Bible may be used in
schools for studying history or ethics, the Court reasoned that the only
effect the posted Ten Commandments could have would be to
encourage students to consider or obey them. The Court held that the
statute lacked a secular purpose, stating "[t]he Ten Commandments are
undeniably a sacred text ... and no legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact."35
B. Marsh v. Chambers
Three years after Stone, the Court cited "unambiguous and
unbroken history" to uphold the Nebraska legislature's practice of
opening its sessions with a prayer by a state-paid chaplain in Marsh v.
The majority concluded that the drafters of the
Chambers.36
Establishment Clause never intended it to forbid prayer in the national
legislature3-as members of the First Congress, those drafters had
approved a statute authorizing the appointment of paid chaplains only
three days before the First Amendment language was finalized.3 8
Reasoning that it would be improper to impose stricter limits on the
states than on the federal government,39 the majority upheld the
Nebraska practice.40
The Court did not consider the three-part Lemon test, and in
dissent, Justice Brennan questioned this departure from convention,
declaring that the majority was simply "carving out an exception to the
Establishment Clause."41
C. Lynch v. Donnelly
The Court returned to the Lemon analysis a year after Marsh in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 2 when it upheld a Rhode Island city's inclusion of a
creche in its holiday display.43 The Court focused its analysis on the

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 41.
463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
Id. at 790.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 790-91.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (focusing on the purpose prong of Lemon).
Id. at 687.
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creche in the context of the holiday season, ' and concluded that
celebrating Christmas and its origins were legitimate secular purposes."
Acknowledging that "on occasion some advancement of religion will
result from government action,"46 the Court held that any benefit to
religion from the creche was indirect and remote, so the display had no

more primary effect of advancing religion than the government's
recognition of the holiday itself."47
Although Justice O'Connor agreed that the display was
constitutional, she proposed a modification of Lemon that would ensure
government neutrality48 by focusing on whether government action is an
endorsement or disapproval of religion.4 9 Defining endorsement as an
action that "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders...
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,"50
Justice O'Connor split her test into an analysis of what message the
government intended to convey and what message was actually
52
received." After noting that context may alter the message conveyed,
she determined that the overall holiday season and the secular symbols
of Christmas surrounding the creche5 3 negated any message of
endorsement in the display."
44. Id. at 679.
45. Id. at 681.
46. Id. at 683.
47. Id. The Court also compared the creche to the "exhibition of literally hundreds of
religious paintings in governmentally supported museums." Id. The Court held that there
was no government entanglement with religion because the city's material contribution to the
creche was minimal. Id. at 684.
48. Van Groningen, supra note 6, at 223. See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If government is to be neutral in matters of
religion . . . government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens
without sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full
members of the political community.").
49. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that the
Establishment Clause bars the government "from making adherence to a religion relevant in
any way to a person's standing in the political community." Id. at 687. The most direct way
for the government to violate this prohibition is by an endorsement or disapproval of religion.
Id. at 688. She advocated endorsement as the proper inquiry under the purpose prong of
Lemon because that test may not be satisfied even when its purpose requirement is met. Id.
at 691. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (invalidating a statute for lack of a
secular purpose despite the fact that the statute required secular notations to be included in
Ten Commandments displays).
50. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 690.
52. Id. at 692.
53. Id. at 669-670. The creche was one piece of a holiday display that included a Santa
Claus house, candy-striped poles, reindeer pulling a sleigh, a Christmas tree, colored lights,
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D. County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test gained majority support five
years after Lynch when inclusion of a creche and a menorah in holiday
displays on government property in Pittsburgh was challenged in County
of Allegheny v. ACLU." As in Lynch, the displays' constitutionality
depended mainly on their particular surroundings.56 Because the creche

display stood alone atop the Grand Staircase of the county courthouse,
the Court concluded that, unlike Lynch, nothing in the display's setting

detracted from its religious message.57 In contrast, the menorah was set
in a less prominent location as part of a display whose focal point was a

towering Christmas tree.5 8 As a result, the Court held that a reasonable
observer would understand the county to be promoting the Christian

message of the creche,59 but would perceive in the menorah only the
city's recognition of different holiday traditions.'
Justice Kennedy characterized the majority's fact-intensive,
"endorsement-in-context" analysis as a "jurisprudence of minutiae"6
that is difficult to apply.6 ' As an alternative to endorsement, he

proposed a test focusing on whether government action compels
religious activity,63 reasoning that "[a]bsent coercion, the risk of
and carolers. Id. at 671 (majority opinion). It was located in a privately-owned park in the
center of the downtown shopping district. Id.
54. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. See 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (stating that Justice O'Connor's endorsement test
"provides a sound analytical framework for evaluating governmental use of religious
symbols").
56. Id. at 597.
57. Id. at 598. The creche was a "visual representation of the scene in the manger in
Bethlehem shortly after the birth of Jesus," which included figures of the baby Jesus, Mary,
Joseph, animals, shepherds, and wise men. Id. at 580. A banner with the words "Gloria in
Excelsis Deo!" hung over the creche, and a nearby plaque stated, "This Display Donated by
the Holy Name Society." Id. The county surrounded the creche with poinsettia plants and a
pair of evergreen trees. Id. The Grand Staircase was a central area of the county courthouse,
id. at 599, and there were no other Christmas decorations on it, id. at 581.
58. See id. at 614-17. The eighteen-foot menorah, a symbol of the Jewish holiday of
Chanukah, was located near a forty-five-foot Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty in an
entrance to the City-County Building. Id. at 617.
59. Id. at 599-600.
60. Id. at 620.
61. Id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 674-75 (suggesting that if the endorsement test depends on the relative
proximity of religious objects to secular ones, the test would be workable only after the Court
"has decided a long series of holiday display cases, using little more than intuition and a tape
measure").
63. Id. at 660. Justice Kennedy reasoned that "freedom to worship as one pleases
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infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation
is minimal."'
E. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe
Coercion and endorsement were central themes in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe,65 when the Court held that a school

district's policy permitting student-led prayer at high school football
games forced fans to "participate in an act of religious worship." 66 The
text of the policy was understood by students as encouraging religious

invocations before games, and the prayers were delivered over the
school's public address system at school-sponsored events. 67 Based on

those facts, the Court concluded that a reasonable person would
perceive the school's approval of the content of the prayers.68
Furthermore, because attendance at games could be mandatory for

players, cheerleaders, or band members, and because social pressures
could make a student's choice not to attend difficult,69 the Court held

that the district's policy would "exact religious conformity from a
student as the price of joining her classmates at a varsity football
game. "T
F. McCreary County v. ACLU
The Court returned to the purpose inquiry of Lemon to invalidate

Ten Commandments displays in Kentucky county courthouses in
McCreary County v. ACLU. 7 Based mainly on the exhibits' tumultuous

history-the counties had already made two unconstitutional attempts
to display the Decalogue 72-the

Court concluded that "[n]o reasonable

without government interference or oppression" is the "great object" of the Establishment
Clause, and prohibiting advancement of religion through government coercion "goes far
toward attainment of this object." Id.
64. Id. at 662.
65. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
66. Id. at 312.
67. Id. at 307.
68. Id. at 307-08.
69. Id. at 311-12.
70. Id. at 312 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595-96 (1992)) (internal
quotations omitted).
71. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2740 (2005).
72. See id. at 2728-31. The counties first displayed the Ten Commandments alone, and
each display was challenged as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2729.
However, before that suit was finished, the county legislatures adopted resolutions calling for
expanded displays. Id. Besides the Ten Commandments, the second displays included eight
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observer could swallow the claim that the Counties had cast off the
objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays."73 The Court also
noted the sectarian tone of the third display, which quoted more of the
"purely religious language, 74 of the Ten Commandments than the
previous exhibits, and emphasized that the Establishment
Clause
75
requires "governmental neutrality in matters of religion.,
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN VAN
ORDEN V. PERRY

Against this backdrop, the Van Orden decision is faulty both in its
method and in its conclusion. When the Court turned to a Marsh-like
historical justification of the Texas monolith, it disregarded two decades
of valid precedent since Marsh with little explanation. 6 As a result, the
Court failed to thoroughly consider factors that would have invalidated
the monolith. Thus, the case was not only wrongly decided, but also
represents a missed opportunity for the Court to bring
clarity to an
"area of constitutional law [that] seems to cry out" for it. 77
A. The Court DisregardedValid Precedentin Upholding the Monolith
On the same day it cited the long-established Lemon test in
McCreary County,8 the Van Orden plurality abandoned much of the
Court's usual analysis,79 thereby avoiding thorough consideration of
valid precedent while also contradicting the dissent of some of its
members in County of Allegheny.
In the later case, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, questioned the Court's adherence to the endorsement
test introduced in Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence.81 The Lynch
other documents that highlighted religious themes. Id. at 2729-30. The district court held the
displays unconstitutional under Lemon, ruling that they lacked a secular purpose because the
selection of documents focused exclusively on Christianity. Id. at 2730.
73. Id. at 2740.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2743.
76. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005) (plurality opinion). After
describing the Lemon test, the Court simply stated: "[W]e think it not useful in dealing with
the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds." Id.
77. Conrad, supra note 2, at 1340.
78. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2730.
79. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863-64.
80. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
81. See supra Part III.C.
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majority had applied the Lemon test," and Justice Kennedy stated that
the principle of stare decisis requires the Court to not only follow prior
holdings but also to adhere "to their explications of the governing rules
of law., 83 Sixteen years later, however, all three Justices followed the

County of Allegheny majority's example in acknowledging the validity
of Lemon without applying it or overturning it. 8'
Although the Van Orden plurality considered the precedent of
Stone, it reasoned that nothing in the latter case indicated that its
holding would extend from the schoolroom to the capitol grounds. 5
However, the Court's application of Stone in McCreary County86 shows
that Stone is not properly read to apply only when government places

religious materials in schools. Furthermore, County of Allegheny
illustrates the rigorous scrutiny that the Court has applied when a
government places religious symbols on public property,87 and it would

be incongruous not to apply that same level of scrutiny to the placement
of the Texas monolith.
Even though Establishment Clause jurisprudence is often
inconsistent, 88 and the plurality noted cases in which the Court ignored
Lemon,

9

the plurality still failed to explain why the three-part test was

simply "not useful" 9 in this particular case. As a result, rather than
directly considering existing Establishment Clause doctrine, the plurality
appears to have followed the Marsh majority in "carving out an
exception" 9' to the Clause.
Describing the Court's "aberrant
departure ' from the settled method in Marsh, Justice Brennan
82. See supra Part III.C.
83. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. Compare Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion) (setting out the Lemon
test's requirements before declining judgment on its fate "in the larger scheme of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence"), with County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (explaining
Lemon test before applying endorsement).
85. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863-64 (plurality opinion).
86. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2737 (2005) ("We take Stone as the
initial legal benchmark, our only case dealing with the constitutionality of displaying the
Commandments.").
87. See supra Part III.D.
88. See Conrad, supra note 2, at 1333-35 (discussing the Court's struggle to "find
consistency in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence over the past half-century").
89. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion) (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639 (2002) and Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) as
recent cases in which the Court has not applied the Lemon test).
90. Id.
91. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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suggested that Establishment
Clause cases are best judged through the
"unsentimental eye" 93 of settled doctrine, rather than by the "unique
history" 94 of the government action at issue. The fact that the majority
returned to apply Lemon a year after Marsh95 and has frequently

applied it since9 strengthens this view.
B. The Monolith's PlacementShould Have Been Held Unconstitutional
Because of its departure from the conventional analysis, the Van
Orden plurality failed to thoroughly examine the context of the disputed

government action, the content of its message, and what a reasonable
observer would understand from the action. Applied in Van Orden,
these considerations should have invalidated the Texas monolith under

any of the tests commonly used in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
1. The Monolith's Placement is Unconstitutional in Light of Its

Context
The Court consistently considers the challenged government action
in its overall context, 97 and, based on its setting, the Texas monolith
should have been held unconstitutional. Like the creche display in

County of Allegheny, which was set in a prominent position at the seat
of government, 98 the monolith occupies ground at the center of state
power.'
Although government use of religious symbols on public
property does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause," some

93. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 795.
95. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 (finding legitimate secular purposes under purpose prong
of Lemon).
96. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 (2005) (applying Lemon
test to strike down Ten Commandments displays in county courthouses); Lynch, 465 U.S. at
679 (applying Lemon test to uphold the inclusion of a creche in a city-owned holiday display);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (applying Lemon test to strike down a statute
requiring that Ten Commandments displays be hung in public schoolrooms).
97. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000) (examining
community and peer pressures of attendance at football games under coercion inquiry);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (stating that "the effect of the
government's use of religious symbolism depends upon its context" under endorsement test);
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-85 (focusing on creche in context of Christmas season while applying
the Lemon test).
98. See supra text accompanying note 57.
99. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (plurality opinion).
100. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621 (holding that menorah's placement
on government property during holiday season was constitutional).
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Justices have advocated a "strong presumption"" against the practice
because it risks offending both members and nonmembers of the faith
being recognized. '°
In addition, the monolith's Judeo-Christian aspect0 3 is not tempered
by its overall setting the way the Lynch creche was. In Lynch, the
creche was surrounded by numerous secular symbols of the holiday.'
In contrast, the monolith is part of a collection of monuments that is
spread over a twenty-two-acre area. Whatever effect these scattered
monuments have on each other, it is not likely as strong as the
neutralizing effect the County of Allegheny Christmas tree had on the
menorah placed in its shadow, so each monument on the Texas Capitol
grounds would likely be taken "on its own terms."1 5 For these reasons,
the monolith also differs from the depictions of religious figures and
symbols in federal architecture described by the plurality," because the
examples listed by the Court are placed near secular figures and symbols
that offset their religious significance. 7
Instead of discussing these contextual considerations, the plurality
inadequately distinguished the Texas monolith from the displays in
Stone. The Court simply described the Texas monolith as "far more
passive" 10 8 than the Stone displays, but did not demonstrate how it is
more "passive" to hang text on a wall than to place the same text on a
monument in the ground.1°9 "The problem in Stone was simply that the

101. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2874 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also County of Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 650 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Establishment Clause should be construed to
create a strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public property.").
102. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he Ten Commandments are
religious-they were so viewed at their inception and so remain.").
104. See supra text accompanying note 53.
105. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2895 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. See supra text accompanying note 18.
107. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2894 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting). Moses appears in the
Supreme Court Courtroom in the company of other lawgivers. Id. at 2862 (plurality opinion).
The depictions of Moses and Saint Paul in the Library of Congress are two of sixteen tightlygrouped statues. Id. at 2894 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting). The inlay containing a depiction of
the Ten Commandments in the floor of the National Archives is one of four such displays,
which do not have a religious theme. Id. In the Chamber of the House of Representatives,
Moses is only one of twenty-three portraits, "each approximately the same size, having no
religious theme," and the Ten Commandments are not-included in the portrait. Id.
108. Id. at 2864 (plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 2896 (Souter, J., dissenting).

2006]

NO CLOSER TO CLARITY

State was putting the Commandments there to be seen, just as the
monument's inscription is there for those who walk by it."' . °
2. The Monolith's Content is Sectarian and Does Not Indicate a
Secular Purpose
Combined with its physical surroundings, the words and symbols
carved into the monolith's face should have invalidated its placement.
Like the unconstitutional McCreary and Stone displays,' the monolith
highlights text that not only proscribes killing or stealing, but also
commands worship of one God in a certain manner.12 The plurality
conceded that the Ten Commandments have religious significance," 3
and this aspect of the display is enhanced by the carved depictions of the
Ten Commandments tablets, Stars of David, and Greek letters
representing Jesus Christ."' The notation at the base of the monument
attributes the religious monolith to the Fraternal Order of Eagles, and
not to the state."5 The County of Allegheny creche's placement was
held unconstitutional despite a nearby plaque which marked its
donation by an outside group," 6 so the Texas monolith should not be
validated by such a notation either.
Furthermore, nothing on the monolith links the Ten
Commandments to the Texan history and identity that the collection of
monuments on the grounds is designed to portray. 7 Instead, the
monolith is like the Decalogue displays in McCreary County, which
were invalidated in part because they did not adequately connect their
religious content to the counties' stated objective of educating citizens
about the foundations of American law."8 There is also no indication on

110. Id.
111. See supra Part III.A, F.
112. See supra text accompanying note 10.
113. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863 (plurality opinion).

114. Id. at 2858.
115. Id.

116. See supra text accompanying note 57.
117. See supra text accompanying note 13.
118. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2740-41 (2005).

The displays

included framed copies of the National Anthem, the National Motto, the Declaration of
Independence, the Mayflower Compact, the Ten Commandments, the Bill of Rights, and the
Magna Carta. Id. at 2731. After describing the lack of common secular theme in the
documents included in the displays, the Court reasoned that if a viewer trying in vain to
discern a secular purpose "had not thrown up his hands, he would probably suspect that the
Counties were simply reaching for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of
courthouses constitutionally required to embody religious neutrality." Id. at 2740-41.
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the monolith of the Fraternal Order of Eagles' purpose to honor its
efforts to fight juvenile delinquency." 9 In this way, the monolith lacks
even the "sham"12 secular objectives represented by the notations on
the unconstitutional Stone displays.2
3.

A Reasonable Observer Would Perceive Advancement of Judeo-

Christianity
Under the Establishment Clause, government action can be
unconstitutional if a viewer could not reasonably think that a religious
display on public property could occupy its location without government
support and approval,'22 and based on the Texas monolith's context, a
reasonable observer would perceive government promotion of its
message. In County of Allegheny, reasonable passersby were held to
perceive an endorsement of Christianity because the creche could not
have been located in the central point of the courthouse without the
approval of the county. l
In Santa Fe Independent School District, a
reasonable student understood the pre-game prayers as stamped with
the school's "seal of approval"' 24 because of their performance on
school-controlled property at school-sponsored events. 5 Pedestrians
on the Texas Capitol grounds could likewise reasonably think that a
large granite block could not be placed there without government
approval, even if they did not know that the state selected the site for
the monument or that its dedication was presided over by state
officials. 26
'

119. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2878 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Fraternal Order of
Eagles hoped to fight juvenile delinquency by presenting the Ten Commandments as a code
of conduct by which youth could live. Id. "It is the Eagles' belief that disseminating the
message conveyed by the Ten Commandments will help to persuade young men and women
to observe civilized standards of behavior." Id.
120. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (quoting Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
121. See supra Part III.A.
122. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989) (holding that no
reasonable person would think a creche could be located on the Grand Staircase of the
county courthouse without government approval).
123. See supra Part III.D.
124. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308.
125. See supra Part III.E.
126. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion). After the monument was
donated, the state organization responsible for maintaining the capitol grounds selected a site
for it. Id. The Fraternal Order of Eagles paid for the monument, whose dedication was
overseen by a pair of state legislators. Id.
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Although decades passed before the monolith was challenged, 7 this
fact does not prove, as the plurality hinted, 128 that a reasonable observer
would not perceive it as a government advancement of religion. In fact,
the unconstitutional creche in County of Allegheny went unchallenged
for five years,2 9 nearly as long as the Van Orden plaintiff regularly
walked by the Texas monument before bringing suit. 3 ° While the
plaintiff may indeed have been the first to understand the monument as
promoting religion, it is equally likely that numerous reasonable people
over the years perceived the same message, but were unwilling to bear
' that may have come
the cost or risk the ,"social ostracism" 31
from suing
the state over it.
Nothing suggests that the Van Orden plaintiff or anyone else has
been coerced into an act of religious worship by the monument, but
because the Court has "never relied on coercion alone as the touchstone
of Establishment Clause analysis,"' 3 2 this fact should not make the
monument constitutional.
C. A Missed Opportunity
Van Orden should be considered not only a validation of an
unconstitutional monument, but also a missed opportunity for the Court
to provide badly-needed guidance in a confused area of constitutional
law.'
The Van Orden plurality noted that it could not abdicate its
responsibility to reach decisions that respect religion's role in the
127. Id.
128. See id. at 2864 (plurality opinion) (noting that plaintiff walked by the monolith for
years without bringing a lawsuit); see also id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]hose 40
years suggest more strongly than can any set of formulaic tests that few individuals ... are
likely to have understood the monument as amounting ...to a government effort to favor a
particular religious sect.").
129. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989). The cr&he was first
displayed in 1981. Id. Litigation commenced in 1986. Id. at 587.
130. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion).
131. Id. at 2897 (Souter, J., dissenting).
132. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 628 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Thomas,
advocating the coercion test in Van Orden, stressed that the monolith in no way compelled
the plaintiff to do anything. Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The
only injury to [the plaintiff] is that he takes offense at seeing the monument as he passes it on
his way to the Texas Supreme Court Library. He need not stop to read it or even to look at it,
let alone to express support for it or adopt the Commandments as guides for his life.").
However, Justice O'Connor explained that a standard that only prohibits coercive
government actions does not "take account of the numerous more subtle ways that
government can show favoritism" to certain beliefs. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627-28
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. See Conrad, supra note 2, at 1340.
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nation's history while maintaining a separation of church from state."'
However, when it disregarded precedent with minimal explanation, the
plurality did just that. Without clear and consistent direction, holdings
at all judicial levels may depend on a "game of Lemon roulette,""' 5
which would not fairly separate church and state or respect religion. If
precedent is valid enough to be acknowledged and not overturned, 136 the
principle of stare decisis described by members of the Van Orden
plurality in County of Allegheny dictates that the precedent be followed.
Conversely, if Lemon or its descendents are "not useful"'37 enough to
even be applied in two cases on the same day, 38 they should be
overturned and replaced, not ignored.
Even Justices Scalia and Thomas, who agreed that the monolith was
constitutional, seemed unsatisfied with the plurality's method and called
for the adoption of an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that can be
consistently applied. 139 Until that call is met, unconstitutional practices
like the placement of the Texas monolith will continue to be upheld,
while other constitutional, actions will likely be struck down. By failing
to provide clear guidance, the Van Orden plurality prolonged this
"disarray at the nation's highest judicial level."' 4
V. CONCLUSION

Considering the complex and inconsistent nature of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, Van Orden may not be a dramatic landmark on
the legal landscape. Still, the case shows how the Court's "unwillingness
to be confined to any single test"'' can cause unconstitutional practices
to be upheld. The Texas monolith places a uniquely Judeo-Christian
text at the heart of state power, and since that text's religious meaning is
not neutralized by anything in the monument's surroundings or content,
a reasonable passerby would perceive it to be a promotion of that
134. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2859 (plurality opinion).

135. Conrad, supra note 2, at 1367.
136. See supra note 96.
137. See supra Part II.
138. Compare Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion) (examining history
instead of applying Lemon), with McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2735 (2005)
(applying Lemon).
139. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I would prefer to reach

the same result by adopting an Establishment Clause jurisprudence . . . that can be
consistently applied ....

").

See also id. at 2868 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A] more

fundamental rethinking of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains in order.").
140. Conrad, supra note 2, at 1340.
141. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
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message by the Texas government. In failing to thoroughly consider its
own precedent or explain its reason for doing so, the Van Orden
plurality not only validated an unconstitutional action, but also ensured
that the confusion in applying the Establishment Clause will continue.
BRETI"B. LARSEN
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